Line data Source code
1 : /*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 : *
3 : * auth.c
4 : * Routines to handle network authentication
5 : *
6 : * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2026, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
7 : * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
8 : *
9 : *
10 : * IDENTIFICATION
11 : * src/backend/libpq/auth.c
12 : *
13 : *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
14 : */
15 :
16 : #include "postgres.h"
17 :
18 : #include <sys/param.h>
19 : #include <sys/select.h>
20 : #include <sys/socket.h>
21 : #include <netinet/in.h>
22 : #include <netdb.h>
23 : #include <pwd.h>
24 : #include <unistd.h>
25 :
26 : #include "commands/user.h"
27 : #include "common/ip.h"
28 : #include "common/md5.h"
29 : #include "libpq/auth.h"
30 : #include "libpq/crypt.h"
31 : #include "libpq/libpq.h"
32 : #include "libpq/oauth.h"
33 : #include "libpq/pqformat.h"
34 : #include "libpq/sasl.h"
35 : #include "libpq/scram.h"
36 : #include "miscadmin.h"
37 : #include "port/pg_bswap.h"
38 : #include "postmaster/postmaster.h"
39 : #include "replication/walsender.h"
40 : #include "storage/ipc.h"
41 : #include "tcop/backend_startup.h"
42 : #include "utils/memutils.h"
43 :
44 : /*----------------------------------------------------------------
45 : * Global authentication functions
46 : *----------------------------------------------------------------
47 : */
48 : static void auth_failed(Port *port, int elevel, int status,
49 : const char *logdetail);
50 : static char *recv_password_packet(Port *port);
51 :
52 :
53 : /*----------------------------------------------------------------
54 : * Password-based authentication methods (password, md5, and scram-sha-256)
55 : *----------------------------------------------------------------
56 : */
57 : static int CheckPasswordAuth(Port *port, const char **logdetail);
58 : static int CheckPWChallengeAuth(Port *port, const char **logdetail);
59 :
60 : static int CheckMD5Auth(Port *port, char *shadow_pass,
61 : const char **logdetail);
62 :
63 :
64 : /*----------------------------------------------------------------
65 : * Ident authentication
66 : *----------------------------------------------------------------
67 : */
68 : /* Max size of username ident server can return (per RFC 1413) */
69 : #define IDENT_USERNAME_MAX 512
70 :
71 : /* Standard TCP port number for Ident service. Assigned by IANA */
72 : #define IDENT_PORT 113
73 :
74 : static int ident_inet(Port *port);
75 :
76 :
77 : /*----------------------------------------------------------------
78 : * Peer authentication
79 : *----------------------------------------------------------------
80 : */
81 : static int auth_peer(Port *port);
82 :
83 :
84 : /*----------------------------------------------------------------
85 : * PAM authentication
86 : *----------------------------------------------------------------
87 : */
88 : #ifdef USE_PAM
89 : #ifdef HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H
90 : #include <pam/pam_appl.h>
91 : #endif
92 : #ifdef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H
93 : #include <security/pam_appl.h>
94 : #endif
95 :
96 : #define PGSQL_PAM_SERVICE "postgresql" /* Service name passed to PAM */
97 :
98 : /* Work around original Solaris' lack of "const" in the conv_proc signature */
99 : #ifdef _PAM_LEGACY_NONCONST
100 : #define PG_PAM_CONST
101 : #else
102 : #define PG_PAM_CONST const
103 : #endif
104 :
105 : static int CheckPAMAuth(Port *port, const char *user, const char *password);
106 : static int pam_passwd_conv_proc(int num_msg,
107 : PG_PAM_CONST struct pam_message **msg,
108 : struct pam_response **resp, void *appdata_ptr);
109 :
110 : static struct pam_conv pam_passw_conv = {
111 : &pam_passwd_conv_proc,
112 : NULL
113 : };
114 :
115 : static const char *pam_passwd = NULL; /* Workaround for Solaris 2.6
116 : * brokenness */
117 : static Port *pam_port_cludge; /* Workaround for passing "Port *port" into
118 : * pam_passwd_conv_proc */
119 : static bool pam_no_password; /* For detecting no-password-given */
120 : #endif /* USE_PAM */
121 :
122 :
123 : /*----------------------------------------------------------------
124 : * BSD authentication
125 : *----------------------------------------------------------------
126 : */
127 : #ifdef USE_BSD_AUTH
128 : #include <bsd_auth.h>
129 :
130 : static int CheckBSDAuth(Port *port, char *user);
131 : #endif /* USE_BSD_AUTH */
132 :
133 :
134 : /*----------------------------------------------------------------
135 : * LDAP authentication
136 : *----------------------------------------------------------------
137 : */
138 : #ifdef USE_LDAP
139 : #ifndef WIN32
140 : /* We use a deprecated function to keep the codepath the same as win32. */
141 : #define LDAP_DEPRECATED 1
142 : #include <ldap.h>
143 : #else
144 : #include <winldap.h>
145 :
146 : #endif
147 :
148 : static int CheckLDAPAuth(Port *port);
149 :
150 : /* LDAP_OPT_DIAGNOSTIC_MESSAGE is the newer spelling */
151 : #ifndef LDAP_OPT_DIAGNOSTIC_MESSAGE
152 : #define LDAP_OPT_DIAGNOSTIC_MESSAGE LDAP_OPT_ERROR_STRING
153 : #endif
154 :
155 : /* Default LDAP password mutator hook, can be overridden by a shared library */
156 : static char *dummy_ldap_password_mutator(char *input);
157 : auth_password_hook_typ ldap_password_hook = dummy_ldap_password_mutator;
158 :
159 : #endif /* USE_LDAP */
160 :
161 : /*----------------------------------------------------------------
162 : * Cert authentication
163 : *----------------------------------------------------------------
164 : */
165 : #ifdef USE_SSL
166 : static int CheckCertAuth(Port *port);
167 : #endif
168 :
169 :
170 : /*----------------------------------------------------------------
171 : * Kerberos and GSSAPI GUCs
172 : *----------------------------------------------------------------
173 : */
174 : char *pg_krb_server_keyfile;
175 : bool pg_krb_caseins_users;
176 : bool pg_gss_accept_delegation;
177 :
178 :
179 : /*----------------------------------------------------------------
180 : * GSSAPI Authentication
181 : *----------------------------------------------------------------
182 : */
183 : #ifdef ENABLE_GSS
184 : #include "libpq/be-gssapi-common.h"
185 :
186 : static int pg_GSS_checkauth(Port *port);
187 : static int pg_GSS_recvauth(Port *port);
188 : #endif /* ENABLE_GSS */
189 :
190 :
191 : /*----------------------------------------------------------------
192 : * SSPI Authentication
193 : *----------------------------------------------------------------
194 : */
195 : #ifdef ENABLE_SSPI
196 : typedef SECURITY_STATUS
197 : (WINAPI * QUERY_SECURITY_CONTEXT_TOKEN_FN) (PCtxtHandle, void **);
198 : static int pg_SSPI_recvauth(Port *port);
199 : static int pg_SSPI_make_upn(char *accountname,
200 : size_t accountnamesize,
201 : char *domainname,
202 : size_t domainnamesize,
203 : bool update_accountname);
204 : #endif
205 :
206 :
207 : /*----------------------------------------------------------------
208 : * Global authentication functions
209 : *----------------------------------------------------------------
210 : */
211 :
212 : /*
213 : * This hook allows plugins to get control following client authentication,
214 : * but before the user has been informed about the results. It could be used
215 : * to record login events, insert a delay after failed authentication, etc.
216 : */
217 : ClientAuthentication_hook_type ClientAuthentication_hook = NULL;
218 :
219 : /*
220 : * Tell the user the authentication failed, but not (much about) why.
221 : *
222 : * There is a tradeoff here between security concerns and making life
223 : * unnecessarily difficult for legitimate users. We would not, for example,
224 : * want to report the password we were expecting to receive...
225 : * But it seems useful to report the username and authorization method
226 : * in use, and these are items that must be presumed known to an attacker
227 : * anyway.
228 : * Note that many sorts of failure report additional information in the
229 : * postmaster log, which we hope is only readable by good guys. In
230 : * particular, if logdetail isn't NULL, we send that string to the log
231 : * when the elevel allows.
232 : */
233 : static void
234 51 : auth_failed(Port *port, int elevel, int status, const char *logdetail)
235 : {
236 : const char *errstr;
237 : char *cdetail;
238 51 : int errcode_return = ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION;
239 :
240 : Assert(elevel >= FATAL); /* we must exit here */
241 :
242 : /*
243 : * If we failed due to EOF from client, just quit; there's no point in
244 : * trying to send a message to the client, and not much point in logging
245 : * the failure in the postmaster log. (Logging the failure might be
246 : * desirable, were it not for the fact that libpq closes the connection
247 : * unceremoniously if challenged for a password when it hasn't got one to
248 : * send. We'll get a useless log entry for every psql connection under
249 : * password auth, even if it's perfectly successful, if we log STATUS_EOF
250 : * events.)
251 : */
252 51 : if (status == STATUS_EOF)
253 23 : proc_exit(0);
254 :
255 28 : switch (port->hba->auth_method)
256 : {
257 0 : case uaReject:
258 : case uaImplicitReject:
259 0 : errstr = gettext_noop("authentication failed for user \"%s\": host rejected");
260 0 : break;
261 1 : case uaTrust:
262 1 : errstr = gettext_noop("\"trust\" authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
263 1 : break;
264 0 : case uaIdent:
265 0 : errstr = gettext_noop("Ident authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
266 0 : break;
267 6 : case uaPeer:
268 6 : errstr = gettext_noop("Peer authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
269 6 : break;
270 6 : case uaPassword:
271 : case uaMD5:
272 : case uaSCRAM:
273 6 : errstr = gettext_noop("password authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
274 : /* We use it to indicate if a .pgpass password failed. */
275 6 : errcode_return = ERRCODE_INVALID_PASSWORD;
276 6 : break;
277 0 : case uaGSS:
278 0 : errstr = gettext_noop("GSSAPI authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
279 0 : break;
280 0 : case uaSSPI:
281 0 : errstr = gettext_noop("SSPI authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
282 0 : break;
283 0 : case uaPAM:
284 0 : errstr = gettext_noop("PAM authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
285 0 : break;
286 0 : case uaBSD:
287 0 : errstr = gettext_noop("BSD authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
288 0 : break;
289 14 : case uaLDAP:
290 14 : errstr = gettext_noop("LDAP authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
291 14 : break;
292 1 : case uaCert:
293 1 : errstr = gettext_noop("certificate authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
294 1 : break;
295 0 : case uaOAuth:
296 0 : errstr = gettext_noop("OAuth bearer authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
297 0 : break;
298 0 : default:
299 0 : errstr = gettext_noop("authentication failed for user \"%s\": invalid authentication method");
300 0 : break;
301 : }
302 :
303 28 : cdetail = psprintf(_("Connection matched file \"%s\" line %d: \"%s\""),
304 28 : port->hba->sourcefile, port->hba->linenumber,
305 28 : port->hba->rawline);
306 28 : if (logdetail)
307 2 : logdetail = psprintf("%s\n%s", logdetail, cdetail);
308 : else
309 26 : logdetail = cdetail;
310 :
311 28 : ereport(elevel,
312 : (errcode(errcode_return),
313 : errmsg(errstr, port->user_name),
314 : logdetail ? errdetail_log("%s", logdetail) : 0));
315 :
316 : /* doesn't return */
317 0 : pg_unreachable();
318 : }
319 :
320 :
321 : /*
322 : * Sets the authenticated identity for the current user. The provided string
323 : * will be stored into MyClientConnectionInfo, alongside the current HBA
324 : * method in use. The ID will be logged if log_connections has the
325 : * 'authentication' option specified.
326 : *
327 : * Auth methods should call this routine exactly once, as soon as the user is
328 : * successfully authenticated, even if they have reasons to know that
329 : * authorization will fail later.
330 : *
331 : * The provided string will be copied into TopMemoryContext, to match the
332 : * lifetime of MyClientConnectionInfo, so it is safe to pass a string that is
333 : * managed by an external library.
334 : */
335 : void
336 136 : set_authn_id(Port *port, const char *id)
337 : {
338 : Assert(id);
339 :
340 136 : if (MyClientConnectionInfo.authn_id)
341 : {
342 : /*
343 : * An existing authn_id should never be overwritten; that means two
344 : * authentication providers are fighting (or one is fighting itself).
345 : * Don't leak any authn details to the client, but don't let the
346 : * connection continue, either.
347 : */
348 0 : ereport(FATAL,
349 : (errmsg("authentication identifier set more than once"),
350 : errdetail_log("previous identifier: \"%s\"; new identifier: \"%s\"",
351 : MyClientConnectionInfo.authn_id, id)));
352 : }
353 :
354 136 : MyClientConnectionInfo.authn_id = MemoryContextStrdup(TopMemoryContext, id);
355 136 : MyClientConnectionInfo.auth_method = port->hba->auth_method;
356 :
357 136 : if (log_connections & LOG_CONNECTION_AUTHENTICATION)
358 : {
359 108 : ereport(LOG,
360 : errmsg("connection authenticated: identity=\"%s\" method=%s "
361 : "(%s:%d)",
362 : MyClientConnectionInfo.authn_id,
363 : hba_authname(MyClientConnectionInfo.auth_method),
364 : port->hba->sourcefile, port->hba->linenumber));
365 : }
366 136 : }
367 :
368 :
369 : /*
370 : * Client authentication starts here. If there is an error, this
371 : * function does not return and the backend process is terminated.
372 : */
373 : void
374 14682 : ClientAuthentication(Port *port)
375 : {
376 14682 : int status = STATUS_ERROR;
377 14682 : const char *logdetail = NULL;
378 :
379 : /*
380 : * "Abandoned" is a SASL-specific state similar to STATUS_EOF, in that we
381 : * don't want to generate any server logs. But it's caused by an in-band
382 : * client action that requires a server response, not an out-of-band
383 : * connection closure, so we can't just proc_exit() like we do with
384 : * STATUS_EOF.
385 : */
386 14682 : bool abandoned = false;
387 :
388 : /*
389 : * Get the authentication method to use for this frontend/database
390 : * combination. Note: we do not parse the file at this point; this has
391 : * already been done elsewhere. hba.c dropped an error message into the
392 : * server logfile if parsing the hba config file failed.
393 : */
394 14682 : hba_getauthmethod(port);
395 :
396 14682 : CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS();
397 :
398 : /*
399 : * This is the first point where we have access to the hba record for the
400 : * current connection, so perform any verifications based on the hba
401 : * options field that should be done *before* the authentication here.
402 : */
403 14682 : if (port->hba->clientcert != clientCertOff)
404 : {
405 : /* If we haven't loaded a root certificate store, fail */
406 38 : if (!secure_loaded_verify_locations())
407 2 : ereport(FATAL,
408 : (errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
409 : errmsg("client certificates can only be checked if a root certificate store is available")));
410 :
411 : /*
412 : * If we loaded a root certificate store, and if a certificate is
413 : * present on the client, then it has been verified against our root
414 : * certificate store, and the connection would have been aborted
415 : * already if it didn't verify ok.
416 : */
417 36 : if (!port->peer_cert_valid)
418 6 : ereport(FATAL,
419 : (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
420 : errmsg("connection requires a valid client certificate")));
421 : }
422 :
423 : /*
424 : * Now proceed to do the actual authentication check
425 : */
426 14674 : switch (port->hba->auth_method)
427 : {
428 0 : case uaReject:
429 :
430 : /*
431 : * An explicit "reject" entry in pg_hba.conf. This report exposes
432 : * the fact that there's an explicit reject entry, which is
433 : * perhaps not so desirable from a security standpoint; but the
434 : * message for an implicit reject could confuse the DBA a lot when
435 : * the true situation is a match to an explicit reject. And we
436 : * don't want to change the message for an implicit reject. As
437 : * noted below, the additional information shown here doesn't
438 : * expose anything not known to an attacker.
439 : */
440 : {
441 : char hostinfo[NI_MAXHOST];
442 : const char *encryption_state;
443 :
444 0 : pg_getnameinfo_all(&port->raddr.addr, port->raddr.salen,
445 : hostinfo, sizeof(hostinfo),
446 : NULL, 0,
447 : NI_NUMERICHOST);
448 :
449 0 : encryption_state =
450 : #ifdef ENABLE_GSS
451 : (port->gss && port->gss->enc) ? _("GSS encryption") :
452 : #endif
453 : #ifdef USE_SSL
454 0 : port->ssl_in_use ? _("SSL encryption") :
455 : #endif
456 0 : _("no encryption");
457 :
458 0 : if (am_walsender && !am_db_walsender)
459 0 : ereport(FATAL,
460 : (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
461 : /* translator: last %s describes encryption state */
462 : errmsg("pg_hba.conf rejects replication connection for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", %s",
463 : hostinfo, port->user_name,
464 : encryption_state)));
465 : else
466 0 : ereport(FATAL,
467 : (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
468 : /* translator: last %s describes encryption state */
469 : errmsg("pg_hba.conf rejects connection for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", database \"%s\", %s",
470 : hostinfo, port->user_name,
471 : port->database_name,
472 : encryption_state)));
473 : break;
474 : }
475 :
476 13 : case uaImplicitReject:
477 :
478 : /*
479 : * No matching entry, so tell the user we fell through.
480 : *
481 : * NOTE: the extra info reported here is not a security breach,
482 : * because all that info is known at the frontend and must be
483 : * assumed known to bad guys. We're merely helping out the less
484 : * clueful good guys.
485 : */
486 : {
487 : char hostinfo[NI_MAXHOST];
488 : const char *encryption_state;
489 :
490 13 : pg_getnameinfo_all(&port->raddr.addr, port->raddr.salen,
491 : hostinfo, sizeof(hostinfo),
492 : NULL, 0,
493 : NI_NUMERICHOST);
494 :
495 26 : encryption_state =
496 : #ifdef ENABLE_GSS
497 : (port->gss && port->gss->enc) ? _("GSS encryption") :
498 : #endif
499 : #ifdef USE_SSL
500 13 : port->ssl_in_use ? _("SSL encryption") :
501 : #endif
502 10 : _("no encryption");
503 :
504 : #define HOSTNAME_LOOKUP_DETAIL(port) \
505 : (port->remote_hostname ? \
506 : (port->remote_hostname_resolv == +1 ? \
507 : errdetail_log("Client IP address resolved to \"%s\", forward lookup matches.", \
508 : port->remote_hostname) : \
509 : port->remote_hostname_resolv == 0 ? \
510 : errdetail_log("Client IP address resolved to \"%s\", forward lookup not checked.", \
511 : port->remote_hostname) : \
512 : port->remote_hostname_resolv == -1 ? \
513 : errdetail_log("Client IP address resolved to \"%s\", forward lookup does not match.", \
514 : port->remote_hostname) : \
515 : port->remote_hostname_resolv == -2 ? \
516 : errdetail_log("Could not translate client host name \"%s\" to IP address: %s.", \
517 : port->remote_hostname, \
518 : gai_strerror(port->remote_hostname_errcode)) : \
519 : 0) \
520 : : (port->remote_hostname_resolv == -2 ? \
521 : errdetail_log("Could not resolve client IP address to a host name: %s.", \
522 : gai_strerror(port->remote_hostname_errcode)) : \
523 : 0))
524 :
525 13 : if (am_walsender && !am_db_walsender)
526 0 : ereport(FATAL,
527 : (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
528 : /* translator: last %s describes encryption state */
529 : errmsg("no pg_hba.conf entry for replication connection from host \"%s\", user \"%s\", %s",
530 : hostinfo, port->user_name,
531 : encryption_state),
532 : HOSTNAME_LOOKUP_DETAIL(port)));
533 : else
534 13 : ereport(FATAL,
535 : (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
536 : /* translator: last %s describes encryption state */
537 : errmsg("no pg_hba.conf entry for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", database \"%s\", %s",
538 : hostinfo, port->user_name,
539 : port->database_name,
540 : encryption_state),
541 : HOSTNAME_LOOKUP_DETAIL(port)));
542 : break;
543 : }
544 :
545 0 : case uaGSS:
546 : #ifdef ENABLE_GSS
547 : /* We might or might not have the gss workspace already */
548 : if (port->gss == NULL)
549 : port->gss = (pg_gssinfo *)
550 : MemoryContextAllocZero(TopMemoryContext,
551 : sizeof(pg_gssinfo));
552 : port->gss->auth = true;
553 :
554 : /*
555 : * If GSS state was set up while enabling encryption, we can just
556 : * check the client's principal. Otherwise, ask for it.
557 : */
558 : if (port->gss->enc)
559 : status = pg_GSS_checkauth(port);
560 : else
561 : {
562 : sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_GSS, NULL, 0);
563 : status = pg_GSS_recvauth(port);
564 : }
565 : #else
566 : Assert(false);
567 : #endif
568 0 : break;
569 :
570 0 : case uaSSPI:
571 : #ifdef ENABLE_SSPI
572 : if (port->gss == NULL)
573 : port->gss = (pg_gssinfo *)
574 : MemoryContextAllocZero(TopMemoryContext,
575 : sizeof(pg_gssinfo));
576 : sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SSPI, NULL, 0);
577 : status = pg_SSPI_recvauth(port);
578 : #else
579 : Assert(false);
580 : #endif
581 0 : break;
582 :
583 29 : case uaPeer:
584 29 : status = auth_peer(port);
585 29 : break;
586 :
587 0 : case uaIdent:
588 0 : status = ident_inet(port);
589 0 : break;
590 :
591 75 : case uaMD5:
592 : case uaSCRAM:
593 75 : status = CheckPWChallengeAuth(port, &logdetail);
594 75 : break;
595 :
596 19 : case uaPassword:
597 19 : status = CheckPasswordAuth(port, &logdetail);
598 19 : break;
599 :
600 0 : case uaPAM:
601 : #ifdef USE_PAM
602 0 : status = CheckPAMAuth(port, port->user_name, "");
603 : #else
604 : Assert(false);
605 : #endif /* USE_PAM */
606 0 : break;
607 :
608 0 : case uaBSD:
609 : #ifdef USE_BSD_AUTH
610 : status = CheckBSDAuth(port, port->user_name);
611 : #else
612 : Assert(false);
613 : #endif /* USE_BSD_AUTH */
614 0 : break;
615 :
616 30 : case uaLDAP:
617 : #ifdef USE_LDAP
618 30 : status = CheckLDAPAuth(port);
619 : #else
620 : Assert(false);
621 : #endif
622 30 : break;
623 14508 : case uaCert:
624 : /* uaCert will be treated as if clientcert=verify-full (uaTrust) */
625 : case uaTrust:
626 14508 : status = STATUS_OK;
627 14508 : break;
628 0 : case uaOAuth:
629 0 : status = CheckSASLAuth(&pg_be_oauth_mech, port, NULL, &logdetail,
630 : &abandoned);
631 0 : break;
632 : }
633 :
634 14661 : if ((status == STATUS_OK && port->hba->clientcert == clientCertFull)
635 14632 : || port->hba->auth_method == uaCert)
636 : {
637 : /*
638 : * Make sure we only check the certificate if we use the cert method
639 : * or verify-full option.
640 : */
641 : #ifdef USE_SSL
642 29 : status = CheckCertAuth(port);
643 : #else
644 : Assert(false);
645 : #endif
646 : }
647 :
648 14661 : if ((log_connections & LOG_CONNECTION_AUTHENTICATION) &&
649 261 : status == STATUS_OK &&
650 261 : !MyClientConnectionInfo.authn_id)
651 : {
652 : /*
653 : * Normally, if log_connections is set, the call to set_authn_id()
654 : * will log the connection. However, if that function is never
655 : * called, perhaps because the trust method is in use, then we handle
656 : * the logging here instead.
657 : */
658 160 : ereport(LOG,
659 : errmsg("connection authenticated: user=\"%s\" method=%s "
660 : "(%s:%d)",
661 : port->user_name, hba_authname(port->hba->auth_method),
662 : port->hba->sourcefile, port->hba->linenumber));
663 : }
664 :
665 14661 : if (ClientAuthentication_hook)
666 0 : (*ClientAuthentication_hook) (port, status);
667 :
668 14661 : if (status == STATUS_OK)
669 14610 : sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_OK, NULL, 0);
670 : else
671 51 : auth_failed(port,
672 51 : abandoned ? FATAL_CLIENT_ONLY : FATAL,
673 : status,
674 : logdetail);
675 14610 : }
676 :
677 :
678 : /*
679 : * Send an authentication request packet to the frontend.
680 : */
681 : void
682 14850 : sendAuthRequest(Port *port, AuthRequest areq, const void *extradata, int extralen)
683 : {
684 : StringInfoData buf;
685 :
686 14850 : CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS();
687 :
688 14850 : pq_beginmessage(&buf, PqMsg_AuthenticationRequest);
689 14850 : pq_sendint32(&buf, (int32) areq);
690 14850 : if (extralen > 0)
691 191 : pq_sendbytes(&buf, extradata, extralen);
692 :
693 14850 : pq_endmessage(&buf);
694 :
695 : /*
696 : * Flush message so client will see it, except for AUTH_REQ_OK and
697 : * AUTH_REQ_SASL_FIN, which need not be sent until we are ready for
698 : * queries.
699 : */
700 14850 : if (areq != AUTH_REQ_OK && areq != AUTH_REQ_SASL_FIN)
701 185 : pq_flush();
702 :
703 14850 : CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS();
704 14850 : }
705 :
706 : /*
707 : * Collect password response packet from frontend.
708 : *
709 : * Returns NULL if couldn't get password, else palloc'd string.
710 : */
711 : static char *
712 52 : recv_password_packet(Port *port)
713 : {
714 : StringInfoData buf;
715 : int mtype;
716 :
717 52 : pq_startmsgread();
718 :
719 : /* Expect 'p' message type */
720 52 : mtype = pq_getbyte();
721 52 : if (mtype != PqMsg_PasswordMessage)
722 : {
723 : /*
724 : * If the client just disconnects without offering a password, don't
725 : * make a log entry. This is legal per protocol spec and in fact
726 : * commonly done by psql, so complaining just clutters the log.
727 : */
728 12 : if (mtype != EOF)
729 0 : ereport(ERROR,
730 : (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
731 : errmsg("expected password response, got message type %d",
732 : mtype)));
733 12 : return NULL; /* EOF or bad message type */
734 : }
735 :
736 40 : initStringInfo(&buf);
737 40 : if (pq_getmessage(&buf, PG_MAX_AUTH_TOKEN_LENGTH)) /* receive password */
738 : {
739 : /* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged a suitable message */
740 0 : pfree(buf.data);
741 0 : return NULL;
742 : }
743 :
744 : /*
745 : * Apply sanity check: password packet length should agree with length of
746 : * contained string. Note it is safe to use strlen here because
747 : * StringInfo is guaranteed to have an appended '\0'.
748 : */
749 40 : if (strlen(buf.data) + 1 != buf.len)
750 0 : ereport(ERROR,
751 : (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
752 : errmsg("invalid password packet size")));
753 :
754 : /*
755 : * Don't allow an empty password. Libpq treats an empty password the same
756 : * as no password at all, and won't even try to authenticate. But other
757 : * clients might, so allowing it would be confusing.
758 : *
759 : * Note that this only catches an empty password sent by the client in
760 : * plaintext. There's also a check in CREATE/ALTER USER that prevents an
761 : * empty string from being stored as a user's password in the first place.
762 : * We rely on that for MD5 and SCRAM authentication, but we still need
763 : * this check here, to prevent an empty password from being used with
764 : * authentication methods that check the password against an external
765 : * system, like PAM and LDAP.
766 : */
767 40 : if (buf.len == 1)
768 0 : ereport(ERROR,
769 : (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PASSWORD),
770 : errmsg("empty password returned by client")));
771 :
772 : /* Do not echo password to logs, for security. */
773 40 : elog(DEBUG5, "received password packet");
774 :
775 : /*
776 : * Return the received string. Note we do not attempt to do any
777 : * character-set conversion on it; since we don't yet know the client's
778 : * encoding, there wouldn't be much point.
779 : */
780 40 : return buf.data;
781 : }
782 :
783 :
784 : /*----------------------------------------------------------------
785 : * Password-based authentication mechanisms
786 : *----------------------------------------------------------------
787 : */
788 :
789 : /*
790 : * Plaintext password authentication.
791 : */
792 : static int
793 19 : CheckPasswordAuth(Port *port, const char **logdetail)
794 : {
795 : char *passwd;
796 : int result;
797 : char *shadow_pass;
798 :
799 19 : sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD, NULL, 0);
800 :
801 19 : passwd = recv_password_packet(port);
802 19 : if (passwd == NULL)
803 9 : return STATUS_EOF; /* client wouldn't send password */
804 :
805 10 : shadow_pass = get_role_password(port->user_name, logdetail);
806 10 : if (shadow_pass)
807 : {
808 10 : result = plain_crypt_verify(port->user_name, shadow_pass, passwd,
809 : logdetail);
810 : }
811 : else
812 0 : result = STATUS_ERROR;
813 :
814 10 : if (shadow_pass)
815 10 : pfree(shadow_pass);
816 10 : pfree(passwd);
817 :
818 10 : if (result == STATUS_OK)
819 10 : set_authn_id(port, port->user_name);
820 :
821 10 : return result;
822 : }
823 :
824 : /*
825 : * MD5 and SCRAM authentication.
826 : */
827 : static int
828 75 : CheckPWChallengeAuth(Port *port, const char **logdetail)
829 : {
830 : int auth_result;
831 : char *shadow_pass;
832 : PasswordType pwtype;
833 :
834 : Assert(port->hba->auth_method == uaSCRAM ||
835 : port->hba->auth_method == uaMD5);
836 :
837 : /* First look up the user's password. */
838 75 : shadow_pass = get_role_password(port->user_name, logdetail);
839 :
840 : /*
841 : * If the user does not exist, or has no password or it's expired, we
842 : * still go through the motions of authentication, to avoid revealing to
843 : * the client that the user didn't exist. If 'md5' is allowed, we choose
844 : * whether to use 'md5' or 'scram-sha-256' authentication based on current
845 : * password_encryption setting. The idea is that most genuine users
846 : * probably have a password of that type, and if we pretend that this user
847 : * had a password of that type, too, it "blends in" best.
848 : */
849 75 : if (!shadow_pass)
850 1 : pwtype = Password_encryption;
851 : else
852 74 : pwtype = get_password_type(shadow_pass);
853 :
854 : /*
855 : * If 'md5' authentication is allowed, decide whether to perform 'md5' or
856 : * 'scram-sha-256' authentication based on the type of password the user
857 : * has. If it's an MD5 hash, we must do MD5 authentication, and if it's a
858 : * SCRAM secret, we must do SCRAM authentication.
859 : *
860 : * If MD5 authentication is not allowed, always use SCRAM. If the user
861 : * had an MD5 password, CheckSASLAuth() with the SCRAM mechanism will
862 : * fail.
863 : */
864 75 : if (port->hba->auth_method == uaMD5 && pwtype == PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5)
865 3 : auth_result = CheckMD5Auth(port, shadow_pass, logdetail);
866 : else
867 72 : auth_result = CheckSASLAuth(&pg_be_scram_mech, port, shadow_pass,
868 : logdetail, NULL /* can't abandon SCRAM */ );
869 :
870 75 : if (shadow_pass)
871 74 : pfree(shadow_pass);
872 : else
873 : {
874 : /*
875 : * If get_role_password() returned error, authentication better not
876 : * have succeeded.
877 : */
878 : Assert(auth_result != STATUS_OK);
879 : }
880 :
881 75 : if (auth_result == STATUS_OK)
882 56 : set_authn_id(port, port->user_name);
883 :
884 75 : return auth_result;
885 : }
886 :
887 : static int
888 3 : CheckMD5Auth(Port *port, char *shadow_pass, const char **logdetail)
889 : {
890 : uint8 md5Salt[4]; /* Password salt */
891 : char *passwd;
892 : int result;
893 :
894 : /* include the salt to use for computing the response */
895 3 : if (!pg_strong_random(md5Salt, 4))
896 : {
897 0 : ereport(LOG,
898 : (errmsg("could not generate random MD5 salt")));
899 0 : return STATUS_ERROR;
900 : }
901 :
902 3 : sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_MD5, md5Salt, 4);
903 :
904 3 : passwd = recv_password_packet(port);
905 3 : if (passwd == NULL)
906 2 : return STATUS_EOF; /* client wouldn't send password */
907 :
908 1 : if (shadow_pass)
909 1 : result = md5_crypt_verify(port->user_name, shadow_pass, passwd,
910 : md5Salt, 4, logdetail);
911 : else
912 0 : result = STATUS_ERROR;
913 :
914 1 : pfree(passwd);
915 :
916 1 : return result;
917 : }
918 :
919 :
920 : /*----------------------------------------------------------------
921 : * GSSAPI authentication system
922 : *----------------------------------------------------------------
923 : */
924 : #ifdef ENABLE_GSS
925 : static int
926 : pg_GSS_recvauth(Port *port)
927 : {
928 : OM_uint32 maj_stat,
929 : min_stat,
930 : lmin_s,
931 : gflags;
932 : int mtype;
933 : StringInfoData buf;
934 : gss_buffer_desc gbuf;
935 : gss_cred_id_t delegated_creds;
936 :
937 : /*
938 : * Use the configured keytab, if there is one. As we now require MIT
939 : * Kerberos, we might consider using the credential store extensions in
940 : * the future instead of the environment variable.
941 : */
942 : if (pg_krb_server_keyfile != NULL && pg_krb_server_keyfile[0] != '\0')
943 : {
944 : if (setenv("KRB5_KTNAME", pg_krb_server_keyfile, 1) != 0)
945 : {
946 : /* The only likely failure cause is OOM, so use that errcode */
947 : ereport(FATAL,
948 : (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
949 : errmsg("could not set environment: %m")));
950 : }
951 : }
952 :
953 : /*
954 : * We accept any service principal that's present in our keytab. This
955 : * increases interoperability between kerberos implementations that see
956 : * for example case sensitivity differently, while not really opening up
957 : * any vector of attack.
958 : */
959 : port->gss->cred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
960 :
961 : /*
962 : * Initialize sequence with an empty context
963 : */
964 : port->gss->ctx = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
965 :
966 : delegated_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
967 : port->gss->delegated_creds = false;
968 :
969 : /*
970 : * Loop through GSSAPI message exchange. This exchange can consist of
971 : * multiple messages sent in both directions. First message is always from
972 : * the client. All messages from client to server are password packets
973 : * (type 'p').
974 : */
975 : do
976 : {
977 : pq_startmsgread();
978 :
979 : CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS();
980 :
981 : mtype = pq_getbyte();
982 : if (mtype != PqMsg_GSSResponse)
983 : {
984 : /* Only log error if client didn't disconnect. */
985 : if (mtype != EOF)
986 : ereport(ERROR,
987 : (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
988 : errmsg("expected GSS response, got message type %d",
989 : mtype)));
990 : return STATUS_ERROR;
991 : }
992 :
993 : /* Get the actual GSS token */
994 : initStringInfo(&buf);
995 : if (pq_getmessage(&buf, PG_MAX_AUTH_TOKEN_LENGTH))
996 : {
997 : /* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged error */
998 : pfree(buf.data);
999 : return STATUS_ERROR;
1000 : }
1001 :
1002 : /* Map to GSSAPI style buffer */
1003 : gbuf.length = buf.len;
1004 : gbuf.value = buf.data;
1005 :
1006 : elog(DEBUG4, "processing received GSS token of length %zu",
1007 : gbuf.length);
1008 :
1009 : maj_stat = gss_accept_sec_context(&min_stat,
1010 : &port->gss->ctx,
1011 : port->gss->cred,
1012 : &gbuf,
1013 : GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
1014 : &port->gss->name,
1015 : NULL,
1016 : &port->gss->outbuf,
1017 : &gflags,
1018 : NULL,
1019 : pg_gss_accept_delegation ? &delegated_creds : NULL);
1020 :
1021 : /* gbuf no longer used */
1022 : pfree(buf.data);
1023 :
1024 : elog(DEBUG5, "gss_accept_sec_context major: %u, "
1025 : "minor: %u, outlen: %zu, outflags: %x",
1026 : maj_stat, min_stat,
1027 : port->gss->outbuf.length, gflags);
1028 :
1029 : CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS();
1030 :
1031 : if (delegated_creds != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && gflags & GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG)
1032 : {
1033 : pg_store_delegated_credential(delegated_creds);
1034 : port->gss->delegated_creds = true;
1035 : }
1036 :
1037 : if (port->gss->outbuf.length != 0)
1038 : {
1039 : /*
1040 : * Negotiation generated data to be sent to the client.
1041 : */
1042 : elog(DEBUG4, "sending GSS response token of length %zu",
1043 : port->gss->outbuf.length);
1044 :
1045 : sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT,
1046 : port->gss->outbuf.value, port->gss->outbuf.length);
1047 :
1048 : gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &port->gss->outbuf);
1049 : }
1050 :
1051 : if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE && maj_stat != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
1052 : {
1053 : gss_delete_sec_context(&lmin_s, &port->gss->ctx, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
1054 : pg_GSS_error(_("accepting GSS security context failed"),
1055 : maj_stat, min_stat);
1056 : return STATUS_ERROR;
1057 : }
1058 :
1059 : if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
1060 : elog(DEBUG4, "GSS continue needed");
1061 :
1062 : } while (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
1063 :
1064 : if (port->gss->cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
1065 : {
1066 : /*
1067 : * Release service principal credentials
1068 : */
1069 : gss_release_cred(&min_stat, &port->gss->cred);
1070 : }
1071 : return pg_GSS_checkauth(port);
1072 : }
1073 :
1074 : /*
1075 : * Check whether the GSSAPI-authenticated user is allowed to connect as the
1076 : * claimed username.
1077 : */
1078 : static int
1079 : pg_GSS_checkauth(Port *port)
1080 : {
1081 : int ret;
1082 : OM_uint32 maj_stat,
1083 : min_stat,
1084 : lmin_s;
1085 : gss_buffer_desc gbuf;
1086 : char *princ;
1087 :
1088 : /*
1089 : * Get the name of the user that authenticated, and compare it to the pg
1090 : * username that was specified for the connection.
1091 : */
1092 : maj_stat = gss_display_name(&min_stat, port->gss->name, &gbuf, NULL);
1093 : if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
1094 : {
1095 : pg_GSS_error(_("retrieving GSS user name failed"),
1096 : maj_stat, min_stat);
1097 : return STATUS_ERROR;
1098 : }
1099 :
1100 : /*
1101 : * gbuf.value might not be null-terminated, so turn it into a regular
1102 : * null-terminated string.
1103 : */
1104 : princ = palloc(gbuf.length + 1);
1105 : memcpy(princ, gbuf.value, gbuf.length);
1106 : princ[gbuf.length] = '\0';
1107 : gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &gbuf);
1108 :
1109 : /*
1110 : * Copy the original name of the authenticated principal into our backend
1111 : * memory for display later.
1112 : *
1113 : * This is also our authenticated identity. Set it now, rather than
1114 : * waiting for the usermap check below, because authentication has already
1115 : * succeeded and we want the log file to reflect that.
1116 : */
1117 : port->gss->princ = MemoryContextStrdup(TopMemoryContext, princ);
1118 : set_authn_id(port, princ);
1119 :
1120 : /*
1121 : * Split the username at the realm separator
1122 : */
1123 : if (strchr(princ, '@'))
1124 : {
1125 : char *cp = strchr(princ, '@');
1126 :
1127 : /*
1128 : * If we are not going to include the realm in the username that is
1129 : * passed to the ident map, destructively modify it here to remove the
1130 : * realm. Then advance past the separator to check the realm.
1131 : */
1132 : if (!port->hba->include_realm)
1133 : *cp = '\0';
1134 : cp++;
1135 :
1136 : if (port->hba->krb_realm != NULL && strlen(port->hba->krb_realm))
1137 : {
1138 : /*
1139 : * Match the realm part of the name first
1140 : */
1141 : if (pg_krb_caseins_users)
1142 : ret = pg_strcasecmp(port->hba->krb_realm, cp);
1143 : else
1144 : ret = strcmp(port->hba->krb_realm, cp);
1145 :
1146 : if (ret)
1147 : {
1148 : /* GSS realm does not match */
1149 : elog(DEBUG2,
1150 : "GSSAPI realm (%s) and configured realm (%s) don't match",
1151 : cp, port->hba->krb_realm);
1152 : pfree(princ);
1153 : return STATUS_ERROR;
1154 : }
1155 : }
1156 : }
1157 : else if (port->hba->krb_realm && strlen(port->hba->krb_realm))
1158 : {
1159 : elog(DEBUG2,
1160 : "GSSAPI did not return realm but realm matching was requested");
1161 : pfree(princ);
1162 : return STATUS_ERROR;
1163 : }
1164 :
1165 : ret = check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, princ,
1166 : pg_krb_caseins_users);
1167 :
1168 : pfree(princ);
1169 :
1170 : return ret;
1171 : }
1172 : #endif /* ENABLE_GSS */
1173 :
1174 :
1175 : /*----------------------------------------------------------------
1176 : * SSPI authentication system
1177 : *----------------------------------------------------------------
1178 : */
1179 : #ifdef ENABLE_SSPI
1180 :
1181 : /*
1182 : * Generate an error for SSPI authentication. The caller should apply
1183 : * _() to errmsg to make it translatable.
1184 : */
1185 : static void
1186 : pg_SSPI_error(int severity, const char *errmsg, SECURITY_STATUS r)
1187 : {
1188 : char sysmsg[256];
1189 :
1190 : if (FormatMessage(FORMAT_MESSAGE_IGNORE_INSERTS |
1191 : FORMAT_MESSAGE_FROM_SYSTEM,
1192 : NULL, r, 0,
1193 : sysmsg, sizeof(sysmsg), NULL) == 0)
1194 : ereport(severity,
1195 : (errmsg_internal("%s", errmsg),
1196 : errdetail_internal("SSPI error %x", (unsigned int) r)));
1197 : else
1198 : ereport(severity,
1199 : (errmsg_internal("%s", errmsg),
1200 : errdetail_internal("%s (%x)", sysmsg, (unsigned int) r)));
1201 : }
1202 :
1203 : static int
1204 : pg_SSPI_recvauth(Port *port)
1205 : {
1206 : int mtype;
1207 : StringInfoData buf;
1208 : SECURITY_STATUS r;
1209 : CredHandle sspicred;
1210 : CtxtHandle *sspictx = NULL,
1211 : newctx;
1212 : TimeStamp expiry;
1213 : ULONG contextattr;
1214 : SecBufferDesc inbuf;
1215 : SecBufferDesc outbuf;
1216 : SecBuffer OutBuffers[1];
1217 : SecBuffer InBuffers[1];
1218 : HANDLE token;
1219 : TOKEN_USER *tokenuser;
1220 : DWORD retlen;
1221 : char accountname[MAXPGPATH];
1222 : char domainname[MAXPGPATH];
1223 : DWORD accountnamesize = sizeof(accountname);
1224 : DWORD domainnamesize = sizeof(domainname);
1225 : SID_NAME_USE accountnameuse;
1226 : char *authn_id;
1227 :
1228 : /*
1229 : * Acquire a handle to the server credentials.
1230 : */
1231 : r = AcquireCredentialsHandle(NULL,
1232 : "negotiate",
1233 : SECPKG_CRED_INBOUND,
1234 : NULL,
1235 : NULL,
1236 : NULL,
1237 : NULL,
1238 : &sspicred,
1239 : &expiry);
1240 : if (r != SEC_E_OK)
1241 : pg_SSPI_error(ERROR, _("could not acquire SSPI credentials"), r);
1242 :
1243 : /*
1244 : * Loop through SSPI message exchange. This exchange can consist of
1245 : * multiple messages sent in both directions. First message is always from
1246 : * the client. All messages from client to server are password packets
1247 : * (type 'p').
1248 : */
1249 : do
1250 : {
1251 : pq_startmsgread();
1252 : mtype = pq_getbyte();
1253 : if (mtype != PqMsg_GSSResponse)
1254 : {
1255 : if (sspictx != NULL)
1256 : {
1257 : DeleteSecurityContext(sspictx);
1258 : free(sspictx);
1259 : }
1260 : FreeCredentialsHandle(&sspicred);
1261 :
1262 : /* Only log error if client didn't disconnect. */
1263 : if (mtype != EOF)
1264 : ereport(ERROR,
1265 : (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
1266 : errmsg("expected SSPI response, got message type %d",
1267 : mtype)));
1268 : return STATUS_ERROR;
1269 : }
1270 :
1271 : /* Get the actual SSPI token */
1272 : initStringInfo(&buf);
1273 : if (pq_getmessage(&buf, PG_MAX_AUTH_TOKEN_LENGTH))
1274 : {
1275 : /* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged error */
1276 : pfree(buf.data);
1277 : if (sspictx != NULL)
1278 : {
1279 : DeleteSecurityContext(sspictx);
1280 : free(sspictx);
1281 : }
1282 : FreeCredentialsHandle(&sspicred);
1283 : return STATUS_ERROR;
1284 : }
1285 :
1286 : /* Map to SSPI style buffer */
1287 : inbuf.ulVersion = SECBUFFER_VERSION;
1288 : inbuf.cBuffers = 1;
1289 : inbuf.pBuffers = InBuffers;
1290 : InBuffers[0].pvBuffer = buf.data;
1291 : InBuffers[0].cbBuffer = buf.len;
1292 : InBuffers[0].BufferType = SECBUFFER_TOKEN;
1293 :
1294 : /* Prepare output buffer */
1295 : OutBuffers[0].pvBuffer = NULL;
1296 : OutBuffers[0].BufferType = SECBUFFER_TOKEN;
1297 : OutBuffers[0].cbBuffer = 0;
1298 : outbuf.cBuffers = 1;
1299 : outbuf.pBuffers = OutBuffers;
1300 : outbuf.ulVersion = SECBUFFER_VERSION;
1301 :
1302 : elog(DEBUG4, "processing received SSPI token of length %u",
1303 : (unsigned int) buf.len);
1304 :
1305 : r = AcceptSecurityContext(&sspicred,
1306 : sspictx,
1307 : &inbuf,
1308 : ASC_REQ_ALLOCATE_MEMORY,
1309 : SECURITY_NETWORK_DREP,
1310 : &newctx,
1311 : &outbuf,
1312 : &contextattr,
1313 : NULL);
1314 :
1315 : /* input buffer no longer used */
1316 : pfree(buf.data);
1317 :
1318 : if (outbuf.cBuffers > 0 && outbuf.pBuffers[0].cbBuffer > 0)
1319 : {
1320 : /*
1321 : * Negotiation generated data to be sent to the client.
1322 : */
1323 : elog(DEBUG4, "sending SSPI response token of length %u",
1324 : (unsigned int) outbuf.pBuffers[0].cbBuffer);
1325 :
1326 : port->gss->outbuf.length = outbuf.pBuffers[0].cbBuffer;
1327 : port->gss->outbuf.value = outbuf.pBuffers[0].pvBuffer;
1328 :
1329 : sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT,
1330 : port->gss->outbuf.value, port->gss->outbuf.length);
1331 :
1332 : FreeContextBuffer(outbuf.pBuffers[0].pvBuffer);
1333 : }
1334 :
1335 : if (r != SEC_E_OK && r != SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
1336 : {
1337 : if (sspictx != NULL)
1338 : {
1339 : DeleteSecurityContext(sspictx);
1340 : free(sspictx);
1341 : }
1342 : FreeCredentialsHandle(&sspicred);
1343 : pg_SSPI_error(ERROR,
1344 : _("could not accept SSPI security context"), r);
1345 : }
1346 :
1347 : /*
1348 : * Overwrite the current context with the one we just received. If
1349 : * sspictx is NULL it was the first loop and we need to allocate a
1350 : * buffer for it. On subsequent runs, we can just overwrite the buffer
1351 : * contents since the size does not change.
1352 : */
1353 : if (sspictx == NULL)
1354 : {
1355 : sspictx = malloc(sizeof(CtxtHandle));
1356 : if (sspictx == NULL)
1357 : ereport(ERROR,
1358 : (errmsg("out of memory")));
1359 : }
1360 :
1361 : memcpy(sspictx, &newctx, sizeof(CtxtHandle));
1362 :
1363 : if (r == SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
1364 : elog(DEBUG4, "SSPI continue needed");
1365 :
1366 : } while (r == SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
1367 :
1368 :
1369 : /*
1370 : * Release service principal credentials
1371 : */
1372 : FreeCredentialsHandle(&sspicred);
1373 :
1374 :
1375 : /*
1376 : * SEC_E_OK indicates that authentication is now complete.
1377 : *
1378 : * Get the name of the user that authenticated, and compare it to the pg
1379 : * username that was specified for the connection.
1380 : */
1381 :
1382 : r = QuerySecurityContextToken(sspictx, &token);
1383 : if (r != SEC_E_OK)
1384 : pg_SSPI_error(ERROR,
1385 : _("could not get token from SSPI security context"), r);
1386 :
1387 : /*
1388 : * No longer need the security context, everything from here on uses the
1389 : * token instead.
1390 : */
1391 : DeleteSecurityContext(sspictx);
1392 : free(sspictx);
1393 :
1394 : if (!GetTokenInformation(token, TokenUser, NULL, 0, &retlen) && GetLastError() != 122)
1395 : ereport(ERROR,
1396 : (errmsg_internal("could not get token information buffer size: error code %lu",
1397 : GetLastError())));
1398 :
1399 : tokenuser = malloc(retlen);
1400 : if (tokenuser == NULL)
1401 : ereport(ERROR,
1402 : (errmsg("out of memory")));
1403 :
1404 : if (!GetTokenInformation(token, TokenUser, tokenuser, retlen, &retlen))
1405 : ereport(ERROR,
1406 : (errmsg_internal("could not get token information: error code %lu",
1407 : GetLastError())));
1408 :
1409 : CloseHandle(token);
1410 :
1411 : if (!LookupAccountSid(NULL, tokenuser->User.Sid, accountname, &accountnamesize,
1412 : domainname, &domainnamesize, &accountnameuse))
1413 : ereport(ERROR,
1414 : (errmsg_internal("could not look up account SID: error code %lu",
1415 : GetLastError())));
1416 :
1417 : free(tokenuser);
1418 :
1419 : if (!port->hba->compat_realm)
1420 : {
1421 : int status = pg_SSPI_make_upn(accountname, sizeof(accountname),
1422 : domainname, sizeof(domainname),
1423 : port->hba->upn_username);
1424 :
1425 : if (status != STATUS_OK)
1426 : /* Error already reported from pg_SSPI_make_upn */
1427 : return status;
1428 : }
1429 :
1430 : /*
1431 : * We have all of the information necessary to construct the authenticated
1432 : * identity. Set it now, rather than waiting for check_usermap below,
1433 : * because authentication has already succeeded and we want the log file
1434 : * to reflect that.
1435 : */
1436 : if (port->hba->compat_realm)
1437 : {
1438 : /* SAM-compatible format. */
1439 : authn_id = psprintf("%s\\%s", domainname, accountname);
1440 : }
1441 : else
1442 : {
1443 : /* Kerberos principal format. */
1444 : authn_id = psprintf("%s@%s", accountname, domainname);
1445 : }
1446 :
1447 : set_authn_id(port, authn_id);
1448 : pfree(authn_id);
1449 :
1450 : /*
1451 : * Compare realm/domain if requested. In SSPI, always compare case
1452 : * insensitive.
1453 : */
1454 : if (port->hba->krb_realm && strlen(port->hba->krb_realm))
1455 : {
1456 : if (pg_strcasecmp(port->hba->krb_realm, domainname) != 0)
1457 : {
1458 : elog(DEBUG2,
1459 : "SSPI domain (%s) and configured domain (%s) don't match",
1460 : domainname, port->hba->krb_realm);
1461 :
1462 : return STATUS_ERROR;
1463 : }
1464 : }
1465 :
1466 : /*
1467 : * We have the username (without domain/realm) in accountname, compare to
1468 : * the supplied value. In SSPI, always compare case insensitive.
1469 : *
1470 : * If set to include realm, append it in <username>@<realm> format.
1471 : */
1472 : if (port->hba->include_realm)
1473 : {
1474 : char *namebuf;
1475 : int retval;
1476 :
1477 : namebuf = psprintf("%s@%s", accountname, domainname);
1478 : retval = check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, namebuf, true);
1479 : pfree(namebuf);
1480 : return retval;
1481 : }
1482 : else
1483 : return check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, accountname, true);
1484 : }
1485 :
1486 : /*
1487 : * Replaces the domainname with the Kerberos realm name,
1488 : * and optionally the accountname with the Kerberos user name.
1489 : */
1490 : static int
1491 : pg_SSPI_make_upn(char *accountname,
1492 : size_t accountnamesize,
1493 : char *domainname,
1494 : size_t domainnamesize,
1495 : bool update_accountname)
1496 : {
1497 : char *samname;
1498 : char *upname = NULL;
1499 : char *p = NULL;
1500 : ULONG upnamesize = 0;
1501 : size_t upnamerealmsize;
1502 : BOOLEAN res;
1503 :
1504 : /*
1505 : * Build SAM name (DOMAIN\user), then translate to UPN
1506 : * (user@kerberos.realm). The realm name is returned in lower case, but
1507 : * that is fine because in SSPI auth, string comparisons are always
1508 : * case-insensitive.
1509 : */
1510 :
1511 : samname = psprintf("%s\\%s", domainname, accountname);
1512 : res = TranslateName(samname, NameSamCompatible, NameUserPrincipal,
1513 : NULL, &upnamesize);
1514 :
1515 : if ((!res && GetLastError() != ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER)
1516 : || upnamesize == 0)
1517 : {
1518 : pfree(samname);
1519 : ereport(LOG,
1520 : (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_ROLE_SPECIFICATION),
1521 : errmsg("could not translate name")));
1522 : return STATUS_ERROR;
1523 : }
1524 :
1525 : /* upnamesize includes the terminating NUL. */
1526 : upname = palloc(upnamesize);
1527 :
1528 : res = TranslateName(samname, NameSamCompatible, NameUserPrincipal,
1529 : upname, &upnamesize);
1530 :
1531 : pfree(samname);
1532 : if (res)
1533 : p = strchr(upname, '@');
1534 :
1535 : if (!res || p == NULL)
1536 : {
1537 : pfree(upname);
1538 : ereport(LOG,
1539 : (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_ROLE_SPECIFICATION),
1540 : errmsg("could not translate name")));
1541 : return STATUS_ERROR;
1542 : }
1543 :
1544 : /* Length of realm name after the '@', including the NUL. */
1545 : upnamerealmsize = upnamesize - (p - upname + 1);
1546 :
1547 : /* Replace domainname with realm name. */
1548 : if (upnamerealmsize > domainnamesize)
1549 : {
1550 : pfree(upname);
1551 : ereport(LOG,
1552 : (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_ROLE_SPECIFICATION),
1553 : errmsg("realm name too long")));
1554 : return STATUS_ERROR;
1555 : }
1556 :
1557 : /* Length is now safe. */
1558 : strcpy(domainname, p + 1);
1559 :
1560 : /* Replace account name as well (in case UPN != SAM)? */
1561 : if (update_accountname)
1562 : {
1563 : if ((p - upname + 1) > accountnamesize)
1564 : {
1565 : pfree(upname);
1566 : ereport(LOG,
1567 : (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_ROLE_SPECIFICATION),
1568 : errmsg("translated account name too long")));
1569 : return STATUS_ERROR;
1570 : }
1571 :
1572 : *p = 0;
1573 : strcpy(accountname, upname);
1574 : }
1575 :
1576 : pfree(upname);
1577 : return STATUS_OK;
1578 : }
1579 : #endif /* ENABLE_SSPI */
1580 :
1581 :
1582 :
1583 : /*----------------------------------------------------------------
1584 : * Ident authentication system
1585 : *----------------------------------------------------------------
1586 : */
1587 :
1588 : /*
1589 : * Per RFC 1413, space and tab are whitespace in ident messages.
1590 : */
1591 : static bool
1592 0 : is_ident_whitespace(const char c)
1593 : {
1594 0 : return c == ' ' || c == '\t';
1595 : }
1596 :
1597 : /*
1598 : * Parse the string "*ident_response" as a response from a query to an Ident
1599 : * server. If it's a normal response indicating a user name, return true
1600 : * and store the user name at *ident_user. If it's anything else,
1601 : * return false.
1602 : */
1603 : static bool
1604 0 : interpret_ident_response(const char *ident_response,
1605 : char *ident_user)
1606 : {
1607 0 : const char *cursor = ident_response; /* Cursor into *ident_response */
1608 :
1609 : /*
1610 : * Ident's response, in the telnet tradition, should end in crlf (\r\n).
1611 : */
1612 0 : if (strlen(ident_response) < 2)
1613 0 : return false;
1614 0 : else if (ident_response[strlen(ident_response) - 2] != '\r')
1615 0 : return false;
1616 : else
1617 : {
1618 0 : while (*cursor != ':' && *cursor != '\r')
1619 0 : cursor++; /* skip port field */
1620 :
1621 0 : if (*cursor != ':')
1622 0 : return false;
1623 : else
1624 : {
1625 : /* We're positioned to colon before response type field */
1626 : char response_type[80];
1627 : int i; /* Index into *response_type */
1628 :
1629 0 : cursor++; /* Go over colon */
1630 0 : while (is_ident_whitespace(*cursor))
1631 0 : cursor++; /* skip blanks */
1632 0 : i = 0;
1633 0 : while (*cursor != ':' && *cursor != '\r' && !is_ident_whitespace(*cursor) &&
1634 : i < (int) (sizeof(response_type) - 1))
1635 0 : response_type[i++] = *cursor++;
1636 0 : response_type[i] = '\0';
1637 0 : while (is_ident_whitespace(*cursor))
1638 0 : cursor++; /* skip blanks */
1639 0 : if (strcmp(response_type, "USERID") != 0)
1640 0 : return false;
1641 : else
1642 : {
1643 : /*
1644 : * It's a USERID response. Good. "cursor" should be pointing
1645 : * to the colon that precedes the operating system type.
1646 : */
1647 0 : if (*cursor != ':')
1648 0 : return false;
1649 : else
1650 : {
1651 0 : cursor++; /* Go over colon */
1652 : /* Skip over operating system field. */
1653 0 : while (*cursor != ':' && *cursor != '\r')
1654 0 : cursor++;
1655 0 : if (*cursor != ':')
1656 0 : return false;
1657 : else
1658 : {
1659 0 : cursor++; /* Go over colon */
1660 0 : while (is_ident_whitespace(*cursor))
1661 0 : cursor++; /* skip blanks */
1662 : /* Rest of line is user name. Copy it over. */
1663 0 : i = 0;
1664 0 : while (*cursor != '\r' && i < IDENT_USERNAME_MAX)
1665 0 : ident_user[i++] = *cursor++;
1666 0 : ident_user[i] = '\0';
1667 0 : return true;
1668 : }
1669 : }
1670 : }
1671 : }
1672 : }
1673 : }
1674 :
1675 :
1676 : /*
1677 : * Talk to the ident server on "remote_addr" and find out who
1678 : * owns the tcp connection to "local_addr"
1679 : * If the username is successfully retrieved, check the usermap.
1680 : *
1681 : * XXX: Using WaitLatchOrSocket() and doing a CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS() if the
1682 : * latch was set would improve the responsiveness to timeouts/cancellations.
1683 : */
1684 : static int
1685 0 : ident_inet(Port *port)
1686 : {
1687 0 : const SockAddr remote_addr = port->raddr;
1688 0 : const SockAddr local_addr = port->laddr;
1689 : char ident_user[IDENT_USERNAME_MAX + 1];
1690 0 : pgsocket sock_fd = PGINVALID_SOCKET; /* for talking to Ident server */
1691 : int rc; /* Return code from a locally called function */
1692 : bool ident_return;
1693 : char remote_addr_s[NI_MAXHOST];
1694 : char remote_port[NI_MAXSERV];
1695 : char local_addr_s[NI_MAXHOST];
1696 : char local_port[NI_MAXSERV];
1697 : char ident_port[NI_MAXSERV];
1698 : char ident_query[80];
1699 : char ident_response[80 + IDENT_USERNAME_MAX];
1700 0 : struct addrinfo *ident_serv = NULL,
1701 0 : *la = NULL,
1702 : hints;
1703 :
1704 : /*
1705 : * Might look a little weird to first convert it to text and then back to
1706 : * sockaddr, but it's protocol independent.
1707 : */
1708 0 : pg_getnameinfo_all(&remote_addr.addr, remote_addr.salen,
1709 : remote_addr_s, sizeof(remote_addr_s),
1710 : remote_port, sizeof(remote_port),
1711 : NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV);
1712 0 : pg_getnameinfo_all(&local_addr.addr, local_addr.salen,
1713 : local_addr_s, sizeof(local_addr_s),
1714 : local_port, sizeof(local_port),
1715 : NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV);
1716 :
1717 0 : snprintf(ident_port, sizeof(ident_port), "%d", IDENT_PORT);
1718 0 : hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
1719 0 : hints.ai_family = remote_addr.addr.ss_family;
1720 0 : hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
1721 0 : hints.ai_protocol = 0;
1722 0 : hints.ai_addrlen = 0;
1723 0 : hints.ai_canonname = NULL;
1724 0 : hints.ai_addr = NULL;
1725 0 : hints.ai_next = NULL;
1726 0 : rc = pg_getaddrinfo_all(remote_addr_s, ident_port, &hints, &ident_serv);
1727 0 : if (rc || !ident_serv)
1728 : {
1729 : /* we don't expect this to happen */
1730 0 : ident_return = false;
1731 0 : goto ident_inet_done;
1732 : }
1733 :
1734 0 : hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
1735 0 : hints.ai_family = local_addr.addr.ss_family;
1736 0 : hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
1737 0 : hints.ai_protocol = 0;
1738 0 : hints.ai_addrlen = 0;
1739 0 : hints.ai_canonname = NULL;
1740 0 : hints.ai_addr = NULL;
1741 0 : hints.ai_next = NULL;
1742 0 : rc = pg_getaddrinfo_all(local_addr_s, NULL, &hints, &la);
1743 0 : if (rc || !la)
1744 : {
1745 : /* we don't expect this to happen */
1746 0 : ident_return = false;
1747 0 : goto ident_inet_done;
1748 : }
1749 :
1750 0 : sock_fd = socket(ident_serv->ai_family, ident_serv->ai_socktype,
1751 0 : ident_serv->ai_protocol);
1752 0 : if (sock_fd == PGINVALID_SOCKET)
1753 : {
1754 0 : ereport(LOG,
1755 : (errcode_for_socket_access(),
1756 : errmsg("could not create socket for Ident connection: %m")));
1757 0 : ident_return = false;
1758 0 : goto ident_inet_done;
1759 : }
1760 :
1761 : /*
1762 : * Bind to the address which the client originally contacted, otherwise
1763 : * the ident server won't be able to match up the right connection. This
1764 : * is necessary if the PostgreSQL server is running on an IP alias.
1765 : */
1766 0 : rc = bind(sock_fd, la->ai_addr, la->ai_addrlen);
1767 0 : if (rc != 0)
1768 : {
1769 0 : ereport(LOG,
1770 : (errcode_for_socket_access(),
1771 : errmsg("could not bind to local address \"%s\": %m",
1772 : local_addr_s)));
1773 0 : ident_return = false;
1774 0 : goto ident_inet_done;
1775 : }
1776 :
1777 0 : rc = connect(sock_fd, ident_serv->ai_addr,
1778 0 : ident_serv->ai_addrlen);
1779 0 : if (rc != 0)
1780 : {
1781 0 : ereport(LOG,
1782 : (errcode_for_socket_access(),
1783 : errmsg("could not connect to Ident server at address \"%s\", port %s: %m",
1784 : remote_addr_s, ident_port)));
1785 0 : ident_return = false;
1786 0 : goto ident_inet_done;
1787 : }
1788 :
1789 : /* The query we send to the Ident server */
1790 0 : snprintf(ident_query, sizeof(ident_query), "%s,%s\r\n",
1791 : remote_port, local_port);
1792 :
1793 : /* loop in case send is interrupted */
1794 : do
1795 : {
1796 0 : CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS();
1797 :
1798 0 : rc = send(sock_fd, ident_query, strlen(ident_query), 0);
1799 0 : } while (rc < 0 && errno == EINTR);
1800 :
1801 0 : if (rc < 0)
1802 : {
1803 0 : ereport(LOG,
1804 : (errcode_for_socket_access(),
1805 : errmsg("could not send query to Ident server at address \"%s\", port %s: %m",
1806 : remote_addr_s, ident_port)));
1807 0 : ident_return = false;
1808 0 : goto ident_inet_done;
1809 : }
1810 :
1811 : do
1812 : {
1813 0 : CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS();
1814 :
1815 0 : rc = recv(sock_fd, ident_response, sizeof(ident_response) - 1, 0);
1816 0 : } while (rc < 0 && errno == EINTR);
1817 :
1818 0 : if (rc < 0)
1819 : {
1820 0 : ereport(LOG,
1821 : (errcode_for_socket_access(),
1822 : errmsg("could not receive response from Ident server at address \"%s\", port %s: %m",
1823 : remote_addr_s, ident_port)));
1824 0 : ident_return = false;
1825 0 : goto ident_inet_done;
1826 : }
1827 :
1828 0 : ident_response[rc] = '\0';
1829 0 : ident_return = interpret_ident_response(ident_response, ident_user);
1830 0 : if (!ident_return)
1831 0 : ereport(LOG,
1832 : (errmsg("invalidly formatted response from Ident server: \"%s\"",
1833 : ident_response)));
1834 :
1835 0 : ident_inet_done:
1836 0 : if (sock_fd != PGINVALID_SOCKET)
1837 0 : closesocket(sock_fd);
1838 0 : if (ident_serv)
1839 0 : pg_freeaddrinfo_all(remote_addr.addr.ss_family, ident_serv);
1840 0 : if (la)
1841 0 : pg_freeaddrinfo_all(local_addr.addr.ss_family, la);
1842 :
1843 0 : if (ident_return)
1844 : {
1845 : /*
1846 : * Success! Store the identity, then check the usermap. Note that
1847 : * setting the authenticated identity is done before checking the
1848 : * usermap, because at this point authentication has succeeded.
1849 : */
1850 0 : set_authn_id(port, ident_user);
1851 0 : return check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, ident_user, false);
1852 : }
1853 0 : return STATUS_ERROR;
1854 : }
1855 :
1856 :
1857 : /*----------------------------------------------------------------
1858 : * Peer authentication system
1859 : *----------------------------------------------------------------
1860 : */
1861 :
1862 : /*
1863 : * Ask kernel about the credentials of the connecting process,
1864 : * determine the symbolic name of the corresponding user, and check
1865 : * if valid per the usermap.
1866 : *
1867 : * Iff authorized, return STATUS_OK, otherwise return STATUS_ERROR.
1868 : */
1869 : static int
1870 29 : auth_peer(Port *port)
1871 : {
1872 : uid_t uid;
1873 : gid_t gid;
1874 : #ifndef WIN32
1875 : struct passwd pwbuf;
1876 : struct passwd *pw;
1877 : char buf[1024];
1878 : int rc;
1879 : int ret;
1880 : #endif
1881 :
1882 29 : if (getpeereid(port->sock, &uid, &gid) != 0)
1883 : {
1884 : /* Provide special error message if getpeereid is a stub */
1885 0 : if (errno == ENOSYS)
1886 0 : ereport(LOG,
1887 : (errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
1888 : errmsg("peer authentication is not supported on this platform")));
1889 : else
1890 0 : ereport(LOG,
1891 : (errcode_for_socket_access(),
1892 : errmsg("could not get peer credentials: %m")));
1893 0 : return STATUS_ERROR;
1894 : }
1895 :
1896 : #ifndef WIN32
1897 29 : rc = getpwuid_r(uid, &pwbuf, buf, sizeof buf, &pw);
1898 29 : if (rc != 0)
1899 : {
1900 0 : errno = rc;
1901 0 : ereport(LOG,
1902 : errmsg("could not look up local user ID %ld: %m", (long) uid));
1903 0 : return STATUS_ERROR;
1904 : }
1905 29 : else if (!pw)
1906 : {
1907 0 : ereport(LOG,
1908 : errmsg("local user with ID %ld does not exist", (long) uid));
1909 0 : return STATUS_ERROR;
1910 : }
1911 :
1912 : /*
1913 : * Make a copy of static getpw*() result area; this is our authenticated
1914 : * identity. Set it before calling check_usermap, because authentication
1915 : * has already succeeded and we want the log file to reflect that.
1916 : */
1917 29 : set_authn_id(port, pw->pw_name);
1918 :
1919 29 : ret = check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name,
1920 : MyClientConnectionInfo.authn_id, false);
1921 :
1922 29 : return ret;
1923 : #else
1924 : /* should have failed with ENOSYS above */
1925 : Assert(false);
1926 : return STATUS_ERROR;
1927 : #endif
1928 : }
1929 :
1930 :
1931 : /*----------------------------------------------------------------
1932 : * PAM authentication system
1933 : *----------------------------------------------------------------
1934 : */
1935 : #ifdef USE_PAM
1936 :
1937 : /*
1938 : * PAM conversation function
1939 : */
1940 :
1941 : static int
1942 0 : pam_passwd_conv_proc(int num_msg, PG_PAM_CONST struct pam_message **msg,
1943 : struct pam_response **resp, void *appdata_ptr)
1944 : {
1945 : const char *passwd;
1946 : struct pam_response *reply;
1947 : int i;
1948 :
1949 0 : if (appdata_ptr)
1950 0 : passwd = (char *) appdata_ptr;
1951 : else
1952 : {
1953 : /*
1954 : * Workaround for Solaris 2.6 where the PAM library is broken and does
1955 : * not pass appdata_ptr to the conversation routine
1956 : */
1957 0 : passwd = pam_passwd;
1958 : }
1959 :
1960 0 : *resp = NULL; /* in case of error exit */
1961 :
1962 0 : if (num_msg <= 0 || num_msg > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
1963 0 : return PAM_CONV_ERR;
1964 :
1965 : /*
1966 : * Explicitly not using palloc here - PAM will free this memory in
1967 : * pam_end()
1968 : */
1969 0 : if ((reply = calloc(num_msg, sizeof(struct pam_response))) == NULL)
1970 : {
1971 0 : ereport(LOG,
1972 : (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
1973 : errmsg("out of memory")));
1974 0 : return PAM_CONV_ERR;
1975 : }
1976 :
1977 0 : for (i = 0; i < num_msg; i++)
1978 : {
1979 0 : switch (msg[i]->msg_style)
1980 : {
1981 0 : case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
1982 0 : if (strlen(passwd) == 0)
1983 : {
1984 : /*
1985 : * Password wasn't passed to PAM the first time around -
1986 : * let's go ask the client to send a password, which we
1987 : * then stuff into PAM.
1988 : */
1989 0 : sendAuthRequest(pam_port_cludge, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD, NULL, 0);
1990 0 : passwd = recv_password_packet(pam_port_cludge);
1991 0 : if (passwd == NULL)
1992 : {
1993 : /*
1994 : * Client didn't want to send password. We
1995 : * intentionally do not log anything about this,
1996 : * either here or at higher levels.
1997 : */
1998 0 : pam_no_password = true;
1999 0 : goto fail;
2000 : }
2001 : }
2002 0 : if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(passwd)) == NULL)
2003 0 : goto fail;
2004 0 : reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
2005 0 : break;
2006 0 : case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
2007 0 : ereport(LOG,
2008 : (errmsg("error from underlying PAM layer: %s",
2009 : msg[i]->msg)));
2010 : pg_fallthrough;
2011 : case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
2012 : /* we don't bother to log TEXT_INFO messages */
2013 0 : if ((reply[i].resp = strdup("")) == NULL)
2014 0 : goto fail;
2015 0 : reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
2016 0 : break;
2017 0 : default:
2018 0 : ereport(LOG,
2019 : (errmsg("unsupported PAM conversation %d/\"%s\"",
2020 : msg[i]->msg_style,
2021 : msg[i]->msg ? msg[i]->msg : "(none)")));
2022 0 : goto fail;
2023 : }
2024 : }
2025 :
2026 0 : *resp = reply;
2027 0 : return PAM_SUCCESS;
2028 :
2029 0 : fail:
2030 : /* free up whatever we allocated */
2031 0 : for (i = 0; i < num_msg; i++)
2032 0 : free(reply[i].resp);
2033 0 : free(reply);
2034 :
2035 0 : return PAM_CONV_ERR;
2036 : }
2037 :
2038 :
2039 : /*
2040 : * Check authentication against PAM.
2041 : */
2042 : static int
2043 0 : CheckPAMAuth(Port *port, const char *user, const char *password)
2044 : {
2045 : int retval;
2046 0 : pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
2047 :
2048 : /*
2049 : * We can't entirely rely on PAM to pass through appdata --- it appears
2050 : * not to work on at least Solaris 2.6. So use these ugly static
2051 : * variables instead.
2052 : */
2053 0 : pam_passwd = password;
2054 0 : pam_port_cludge = port;
2055 0 : pam_no_password = false;
2056 :
2057 : /*
2058 : * Set the application data portion of the conversation struct. This is
2059 : * later used inside the PAM conversation to pass the password to the
2060 : * authentication module.
2061 : */
2062 0 : pam_passw_conv.appdata_ptr = unconstify(char *, password); /* from password above,
2063 : * not allocated */
2064 :
2065 : /* Optionally, one can set the service name in pg_hba.conf */
2066 0 : if (port->hba->pamservice && port->hba->pamservice[0] != '\0')
2067 0 : retval = pam_start(port->hba->pamservice, "pgsql@",
2068 : &pam_passw_conv, &pamh);
2069 : else
2070 0 : retval = pam_start(PGSQL_PAM_SERVICE, "pgsql@",
2071 : &pam_passw_conv, &pamh);
2072 :
2073 0 : if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
2074 : {
2075 0 : ereport(LOG,
2076 : (errmsg("could not create PAM authenticator: %s",
2077 : pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
2078 0 : pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */
2079 0 : return STATUS_ERROR;
2080 : }
2081 :
2082 0 : retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_USER, user);
2083 :
2084 0 : if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
2085 : {
2086 0 : ereport(LOG,
2087 : (errmsg("pam_set_item(PAM_USER) failed: %s",
2088 : pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
2089 0 : pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */
2090 0 : return STATUS_ERROR;
2091 : }
2092 :
2093 0 : if (port->hba->conntype != ctLocal)
2094 : {
2095 : char hostinfo[NI_MAXHOST];
2096 : int flags;
2097 :
2098 0 : if (port->hba->pam_use_hostname)
2099 0 : flags = 0;
2100 : else
2101 0 : flags = NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV;
2102 :
2103 0 : retval = pg_getnameinfo_all(&port->raddr.addr, port->raddr.salen,
2104 : hostinfo, sizeof(hostinfo), NULL, 0,
2105 : flags);
2106 0 : if (retval != 0)
2107 : {
2108 0 : ereport(WARNING,
2109 : (errmsg_internal("pg_getnameinfo_all() failed: %s",
2110 : gai_strerror(retval))));
2111 0 : return STATUS_ERROR;
2112 : }
2113 :
2114 0 : retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_RHOST, hostinfo);
2115 :
2116 0 : if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
2117 : {
2118 0 : ereport(LOG,
2119 : (errmsg("pam_set_item(PAM_RHOST) failed: %s",
2120 : pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
2121 0 : pam_passwd = NULL;
2122 0 : return STATUS_ERROR;
2123 : }
2124 : }
2125 :
2126 0 : retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_CONV, &pam_passw_conv);
2127 :
2128 0 : if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
2129 : {
2130 0 : ereport(LOG,
2131 : (errmsg("pam_set_item(PAM_CONV) failed: %s",
2132 : pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
2133 0 : pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */
2134 0 : return STATUS_ERROR;
2135 : }
2136 :
2137 0 : retval = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0);
2138 :
2139 0 : if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
2140 : {
2141 : /* If pam_passwd_conv_proc saw EOF, don't log anything */
2142 0 : if (!pam_no_password)
2143 0 : ereport(LOG,
2144 : (errmsg("pam_authenticate failed: %s",
2145 : pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
2146 0 : pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */
2147 0 : return pam_no_password ? STATUS_EOF : STATUS_ERROR;
2148 : }
2149 :
2150 0 : retval = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, 0);
2151 :
2152 0 : if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
2153 : {
2154 : /* If pam_passwd_conv_proc saw EOF, don't log anything */
2155 0 : if (!pam_no_password)
2156 0 : ereport(LOG,
2157 : (errmsg("pam_acct_mgmt failed: %s",
2158 : pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
2159 0 : pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */
2160 0 : return pam_no_password ? STATUS_EOF : STATUS_ERROR;
2161 : }
2162 :
2163 0 : retval = pam_end(pamh, retval);
2164 :
2165 0 : if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
2166 : {
2167 0 : ereport(LOG,
2168 : (errmsg("could not release PAM authenticator: %s",
2169 : pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
2170 : }
2171 :
2172 0 : pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */
2173 :
2174 0 : if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS)
2175 0 : set_authn_id(port, user);
2176 :
2177 0 : return (retval == PAM_SUCCESS ? STATUS_OK : STATUS_ERROR);
2178 : }
2179 : #endif /* USE_PAM */
2180 :
2181 :
2182 : /*----------------------------------------------------------------
2183 : * BSD authentication system
2184 : *----------------------------------------------------------------
2185 : */
2186 : #ifdef USE_BSD_AUTH
2187 : static int
2188 : CheckBSDAuth(Port *port, char *user)
2189 : {
2190 : char *passwd;
2191 : int retval;
2192 :
2193 : /* Send regular password request to client, and get the response */
2194 : sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD, NULL, 0);
2195 :
2196 : passwd = recv_password_packet(port);
2197 : if (passwd == NULL)
2198 : return STATUS_EOF;
2199 :
2200 : /*
2201 : * Ask the BSD auth system to verify password. Note that auth_userokay
2202 : * will overwrite the password string with zeroes, but it's just a
2203 : * temporary string so we don't care.
2204 : */
2205 : retval = auth_userokay(user, NULL, "auth-postgresql", passwd);
2206 :
2207 : pfree(passwd);
2208 :
2209 : if (!retval)
2210 : return STATUS_ERROR;
2211 :
2212 : set_authn_id(port, user);
2213 : return STATUS_OK;
2214 : }
2215 : #endif /* USE_BSD_AUTH */
2216 :
2217 :
2218 : /*----------------------------------------------------------------
2219 : * LDAP authentication system
2220 : *----------------------------------------------------------------
2221 : */
2222 : #ifdef USE_LDAP
2223 :
2224 : static int errdetail_for_ldap(LDAP *ldap);
2225 :
2226 : /*
2227 : * Initialize a connection to the LDAP server, including setting up
2228 : * TLS if requested.
2229 : */
2230 : static int
2231 29 : InitializeLDAPConnection(Port *port, LDAP **ldap)
2232 : {
2233 : const char *scheme;
2234 29 : int ldapversion = LDAP_VERSION3;
2235 : int r;
2236 :
2237 29 : scheme = port->hba->ldapscheme;
2238 29 : if (scheme == NULL)
2239 18 : scheme = "ldap";
2240 : #ifdef WIN32
2241 : if (strcmp(scheme, "ldaps") == 0)
2242 : *ldap = ldap_sslinit(port->hba->ldapserver, port->hba->ldapport, 1);
2243 : else
2244 : *ldap = ldap_init(port->hba->ldapserver, port->hba->ldapport);
2245 : if (!*ldap)
2246 : {
2247 : ereport(LOG,
2248 : (errmsg("could not initialize LDAP: error code %lu",
2249 : LdapGetLastError())));
2250 :
2251 : return STATUS_ERROR;
2252 : }
2253 : #else
2254 : #ifdef HAVE_LDAP_INITIALIZE
2255 :
2256 : /*
2257 : * OpenLDAP provides a non-standard extension ldap_initialize() that takes
2258 : * a list of URIs, allowing us to request "ldaps" instead of "ldap". It
2259 : * also provides ldap_domain2hostlist() to find LDAP servers automatically
2260 : * using DNS SRV. They were introduced in the same version, so for now we
2261 : * don't have an extra configure check for the latter.
2262 : */
2263 : {
2264 : StringInfoData uris;
2265 29 : char *hostlist = NULL;
2266 : char *p;
2267 : bool append_port;
2268 :
2269 : /* We'll build a space-separated scheme://hostname:port list here */
2270 29 : initStringInfo(&uris);
2271 :
2272 : /*
2273 : * If pg_hba.conf provided no hostnames, we can ask OpenLDAP to try to
2274 : * find some by extracting a domain name from the base DN and looking
2275 : * up DSN SRV records for _ldap._tcp.<domain>.
2276 : */
2277 29 : if (!port->hba->ldapserver || port->hba->ldapserver[0] == '\0')
2278 0 : {
2279 : char *domain;
2280 :
2281 : /* ou=blah,dc=foo,dc=bar -> foo.bar */
2282 0 : if (ldap_dn2domain(port->hba->ldapbasedn, &domain))
2283 : {
2284 0 : ereport(LOG,
2285 : (errmsg("could not extract domain name from ldapbasedn")));
2286 0 : return STATUS_ERROR;
2287 : }
2288 :
2289 : /* Look up a list of LDAP server hosts and port numbers */
2290 0 : if (ldap_domain2hostlist(domain, &hostlist))
2291 : {
2292 0 : ereport(LOG,
2293 : (errmsg("LDAP authentication could not find DNS SRV records for \"%s\"",
2294 : domain),
2295 : (errhint("Set an LDAP server name explicitly."))));
2296 0 : ldap_memfree(domain);
2297 0 : return STATUS_ERROR;
2298 : }
2299 0 : ldap_memfree(domain);
2300 :
2301 : /* We have a space-separated list of host:port entries */
2302 0 : p = hostlist;
2303 0 : append_port = false;
2304 : }
2305 : else
2306 : {
2307 : /* We have a space-separated list of hosts from pg_hba.conf */
2308 29 : p = port->hba->ldapserver;
2309 29 : append_port = true;
2310 : }
2311 :
2312 : /* Convert the list of host[:port] entries to full URIs */
2313 : do
2314 : {
2315 : size_t size;
2316 :
2317 : /* Find the span of the next entry */
2318 32 : size = strcspn(p, " ");
2319 :
2320 : /* Append a space separator if this isn't the first URI */
2321 32 : if (uris.len > 0)
2322 3 : appendStringInfoChar(&uris, ' ');
2323 :
2324 : /* Append scheme://host:port */
2325 32 : appendStringInfoString(&uris, scheme);
2326 32 : appendStringInfoString(&uris, "://");
2327 32 : appendBinaryStringInfo(&uris, p, size);
2328 32 : if (append_port)
2329 32 : appendStringInfo(&uris, ":%d", port->hba->ldapport);
2330 :
2331 : /* Step over this entry and any number of trailing spaces */
2332 32 : p += size;
2333 35 : while (*p == ' ')
2334 3 : ++p;
2335 32 : } while (*p);
2336 :
2337 : /* Free memory from OpenLDAP if we looked up SRV records */
2338 29 : if (hostlist)
2339 0 : ldap_memfree(hostlist);
2340 :
2341 : /* Finally, try to connect using the URI list */
2342 29 : r = ldap_initialize(ldap, uris.data);
2343 29 : pfree(uris.data);
2344 29 : if (r != LDAP_SUCCESS)
2345 : {
2346 0 : ereport(LOG,
2347 : (errmsg("could not initialize LDAP: %s",
2348 : ldap_err2string(r))));
2349 :
2350 0 : return STATUS_ERROR;
2351 : }
2352 : }
2353 : #else
2354 : if (strcmp(scheme, "ldaps") == 0)
2355 : {
2356 : ereport(LOG,
2357 : (errmsg("ldaps not supported with this LDAP library")));
2358 :
2359 : return STATUS_ERROR;
2360 : }
2361 : *ldap = ldap_init(port->hba->ldapserver, port->hba->ldapport);
2362 : if (!*ldap)
2363 : {
2364 : ereport(LOG,
2365 : (errmsg("could not initialize LDAP: %m")));
2366 :
2367 : return STATUS_ERROR;
2368 : }
2369 : #endif
2370 : #endif
2371 :
2372 29 : if ((r = ldap_set_option(*ldap, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, &ldapversion)) != LDAP_SUCCESS)
2373 : {
2374 0 : ereport(LOG,
2375 : (errmsg("could not set LDAP protocol version: %s",
2376 : ldap_err2string(r)),
2377 : errdetail_for_ldap(*ldap)));
2378 0 : ldap_unbind(*ldap);
2379 0 : return STATUS_ERROR;
2380 : }
2381 :
2382 29 : if (port->hba->ldaptls)
2383 : {
2384 : #ifndef WIN32
2385 1 : if ((r = ldap_start_tls_s(*ldap, NULL, NULL)) != LDAP_SUCCESS)
2386 : #else
2387 : if ((r = ldap_start_tls_s(*ldap, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != LDAP_SUCCESS)
2388 : #endif
2389 : {
2390 0 : ereport(LOG,
2391 : (errmsg("could not start LDAP TLS session: %s",
2392 : ldap_err2string(r)),
2393 : errdetail_for_ldap(*ldap)));
2394 0 : ldap_unbind(*ldap);
2395 0 : return STATUS_ERROR;
2396 : }
2397 : }
2398 :
2399 29 : return STATUS_OK;
2400 : }
2401 :
2402 : /* Placeholders recognized by FormatSearchFilter. For now just one. */
2403 : #define LPH_USERNAME "$username"
2404 : #define LPH_USERNAME_LEN (sizeof(LPH_USERNAME) - 1)
2405 :
2406 : /* Not all LDAP implementations define this. */
2407 : #ifndef LDAP_NO_ATTRS
2408 : #define LDAP_NO_ATTRS "1.1"
2409 : #endif
2410 :
2411 : /* Not all LDAP implementations define this. */
2412 : #ifndef LDAPS_PORT
2413 : #define LDAPS_PORT 636
2414 : #endif
2415 :
2416 : static char *
2417 1 : dummy_ldap_password_mutator(char *input)
2418 : {
2419 1 : return input;
2420 : }
2421 :
2422 : /*
2423 : * Return a newly allocated C string copied from "pattern" with all
2424 : * occurrences of the placeholder "$username" replaced with "user_name".
2425 : */
2426 : static char *
2427 8 : FormatSearchFilter(const char *pattern, const char *user_name)
2428 : {
2429 : StringInfoData output;
2430 :
2431 8 : initStringInfo(&output);
2432 119 : while (*pattern != '\0')
2433 : {
2434 111 : if (strncmp(pattern, LPH_USERNAME, LPH_USERNAME_LEN) == 0)
2435 : {
2436 13 : appendStringInfoString(&output, user_name);
2437 13 : pattern += LPH_USERNAME_LEN;
2438 : }
2439 : else
2440 98 : appendStringInfoChar(&output, *pattern++);
2441 : }
2442 :
2443 8 : return output.data;
2444 : }
2445 :
2446 : /*
2447 : * Perform LDAP authentication
2448 : */
2449 : static int
2450 30 : CheckLDAPAuth(Port *port)
2451 : {
2452 : char *passwd;
2453 : LDAP *ldap;
2454 : int r;
2455 : char *fulluser;
2456 : const char *server_name;
2457 :
2458 : #ifdef HAVE_LDAP_INITIALIZE
2459 :
2460 : /*
2461 : * For OpenLDAP, allow empty hostname if we have a basedn. We'll look for
2462 : * servers with DNS SRV records via OpenLDAP library facilities.
2463 : */
2464 30 : if ((!port->hba->ldapserver || port->hba->ldapserver[0] == '\0') &&
2465 0 : (!port->hba->ldapbasedn || port->hba->ldapbasedn[0] == '\0'))
2466 : {
2467 0 : ereport(LOG,
2468 : (errmsg("LDAP server not specified, and no ldapbasedn")));
2469 0 : return STATUS_ERROR;
2470 : }
2471 : #else
2472 : if (!port->hba->ldapserver || port->hba->ldapserver[0] == '\0')
2473 : {
2474 : ereport(LOG,
2475 : (errmsg("LDAP server not specified")));
2476 : return STATUS_ERROR;
2477 : }
2478 : #endif
2479 :
2480 : /*
2481 : * If we're using SRV records, we don't have a server name so we'll just
2482 : * show an empty string in error messages.
2483 : */
2484 30 : server_name = port->hba->ldapserver ? port->hba->ldapserver : "";
2485 :
2486 30 : if (port->hba->ldapport == 0)
2487 : {
2488 0 : if (port->hba->ldapscheme != NULL &&
2489 0 : strcmp(port->hba->ldapscheme, "ldaps") == 0)
2490 0 : port->hba->ldapport = LDAPS_PORT;
2491 : else
2492 0 : port->hba->ldapport = LDAP_PORT;
2493 : }
2494 :
2495 30 : sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD, NULL, 0);
2496 :
2497 30 : passwd = recv_password_packet(port);
2498 30 : if (passwd == NULL)
2499 1 : return STATUS_EOF; /* client wouldn't send password */
2500 :
2501 29 : if (InitializeLDAPConnection(port, &ldap) == STATUS_ERROR)
2502 : {
2503 : /* Error message already sent */
2504 0 : pfree(passwd);
2505 0 : return STATUS_ERROR;
2506 : }
2507 :
2508 29 : if (port->hba->ldapbasedn)
2509 : {
2510 : /*
2511 : * First perform an LDAP search to find the DN for the user we are
2512 : * trying to log in as.
2513 : */
2514 : char *filter;
2515 : LDAPMessage *search_message;
2516 : LDAPMessage *entry;
2517 21 : char *attributes[] = {LDAP_NO_ATTRS, NULL};
2518 : char *dn;
2519 : char *c;
2520 : int count;
2521 :
2522 : /*
2523 : * Disallow any characters that we would otherwise need to escape,
2524 : * since they aren't really reasonable in a username anyway. Allowing
2525 : * them would make it possible to inject any kind of custom filters in
2526 : * the LDAP filter.
2527 : */
2528 150 : for (c = port->user_name; *c; c++)
2529 : {
2530 129 : if (*c == '*' ||
2531 129 : *c == '(' ||
2532 129 : *c == ')' ||
2533 129 : *c == '\\' ||
2534 129 : *c == '/')
2535 : {
2536 0 : ereport(LOG,
2537 : (errmsg("invalid character in user name for LDAP authentication")));
2538 0 : ldap_unbind(ldap);
2539 0 : pfree(passwd);
2540 6 : return STATUS_ERROR;
2541 : }
2542 : }
2543 :
2544 : /*
2545 : * Bind with a pre-defined username/password (if available) for
2546 : * searching. If none is specified, this turns into an anonymous bind.
2547 : */
2548 39 : r = ldap_simple_bind_s(ldap,
2549 21 : port->hba->ldapbinddn ? port->hba->ldapbinddn : "",
2550 21 : port->hba->ldapbindpasswd ? ldap_password_hook(port->hba->ldapbindpasswd) : "");
2551 21 : if (r != LDAP_SUCCESS)
2552 : {
2553 3 : ereport(LOG,
2554 : (errmsg("could not perform initial LDAP bind for ldapbinddn \"%s\" on server \"%s\": %s",
2555 : port->hba->ldapbinddn ? port->hba->ldapbinddn : "",
2556 : server_name,
2557 : ldap_err2string(r)),
2558 : errdetail_for_ldap(ldap)));
2559 3 : ldap_unbind(ldap);
2560 3 : pfree(passwd);
2561 3 : return STATUS_ERROR;
2562 : }
2563 :
2564 : /* Build a custom filter or a single attribute filter? */
2565 18 : if (port->hba->ldapsearchfilter)
2566 8 : filter = FormatSearchFilter(port->hba->ldapsearchfilter, port->user_name);
2567 10 : else if (port->hba->ldapsearchattribute)
2568 3 : filter = psprintf("(%s=%s)", port->hba->ldapsearchattribute, port->user_name);
2569 : else
2570 7 : filter = psprintf("(uid=%s)", port->user_name);
2571 :
2572 18 : search_message = NULL;
2573 18 : r = ldap_search_s(ldap,
2574 18 : port->hba->ldapbasedn,
2575 18 : port->hba->ldapscope,
2576 : filter,
2577 : attributes,
2578 : 0,
2579 : &search_message);
2580 :
2581 18 : if (r != LDAP_SUCCESS)
2582 : {
2583 0 : ereport(LOG,
2584 : (errmsg("could not search LDAP for filter \"%s\" on server \"%s\": %s",
2585 : filter, server_name, ldap_err2string(r)),
2586 : errdetail_for_ldap(ldap)));
2587 0 : if (search_message != NULL)
2588 0 : ldap_msgfree(search_message);
2589 0 : ldap_unbind(ldap);
2590 0 : pfree(passwd);
2591 0 : pfree(filter);
2592 0 : return STATUS_ERROR;
2593 : }
2594 :
2595 18 : count = ldap_count_entries(ldap, search_message);
2596 18 : if (count != 1)
2597 : {
2598 3 : if (count == 0)
2599 3 : ereport(LOG,
2600 : (errmsg("LDAP user \"%s\" does not exist", port->user_name),
2601 : errdetail("LDAP search for filter \"%s\" on server \"%s\" returned no entries.",
2602 : filter, server_name)));
2603 : else
2604 0 : ereport(LOG,
2605 : (errmsg("LDAP user \"%s\" is not unique", port->user_name),
2606 : errdetail_plural("LDAP search for filter \"%s\" on server \"%s\" returned %d entry.",
2607 : "LDAP search for filter \"%s\" on server \"%s\" returned %d entries.",
2608 : count,
2609 : filter, server_name, count)));
2610 :
2611 3 : ldap_unbind(ldap);
2612 3 : pfree(passwd);
2613 3 : pfree(filter);
2614 3 : ldap_msgfree(search_message);
2615 3 : return STATUS_ERROR;
2616 : }
2617 :
2618 15 : entry = ldap_first_entry(ldap, search_message);
2619 15 : dn = ldap_get_dn(ldap, entry);
2620 15 : if (dn == NULL)
2621 : {
2622 : int error;
2623 :
2624 0 : (void) ldap_get_option(ldap, LDAP_OPT_ERROR_NUMBER, &error);
2625 0 : ereport(LOG,
2626 : (errmsg("could not get dn for the first entry matching \"%s\" on server \"%s\": %s",
2627 : filter, server_name,
2628 : ldap_err2string(error)),
2629 : errdetail_for_ldap(ldap)));
2630 0 : ldap_unbind(ldap);
2631 0 : pfree(passwd);
2632 0 : pfree(filter);
2633 0 : ldap_msgfree(search_message);
2634 0 : return STATUS_ERROR;
2635 : }
2636 15 : fulluser = pstrdup(dn);
2637 :
2638 15 : pfree(filter);
2639 15 : ldap_memfree(dn);
2640 15 : ldap_msgfree(search_message);
2641 : }
2642 : else
2643 8 : fulluser = psprintf("%s%s%s",
2644 8 : port->hba->ldapprefix ? port->hba->ldapprefix : "",
2645 : port->user_name,
2646 8 : port->hba->ldapsuffix ? port->hba->ldapsuffix : "");
2647 :
2648 23 : r = ldap_simple_bind_s(ldap, fulluser, passwd);
2649 :
2650 23 : if (r != LDAP_SUCCESS)
2651 : {
2652 8 : ereport(LOG,
2653 : (errmsg("LDAP login failed for user \"%s\" on server \"%s\": %s",
2654 : fulluser, server_name, ldap_err2string(r)),
2655 : errdetail_for_ldap(ldap)));
2656 8 : ldap_unbind(ldap);
2657 8 : pfree(passwd);
2658 8 : pfree(fulluser);
2659 8 : return STATUS_ERROR;
2660 : }
2661 :
2662 : /* Save the original bind DN as the authenticated identity. */
2663 15 : set_authn_id(port, fulluser);
2664 :
2665 15 : ldap_unbind(ldap);
2666 15 : pfree(passwd);
2667 15 : pfree(fulluser);
2668 :
2669 15 : return STATUS_OK;
2670 : }
2671 :
2672 : /*
2673 : * Add a detail error message text to the current error if one can be
2674 : * constructed from the LDAP 'diagnostic message'.
2675 : */
2676 : static int
2677 11 : errdetail_for_ldap(LDAP *ldap)
2678 : {
2679 : char *message;
2680 : int rc;
2681 :
2682 11 : rc = ldap_get_option(ldap, LDAP_OPT_DIAGNOSTIC_MESSAGE, &message);
2683 11 : if (rc == LDAP_SUCCESS && message != NULL)
2684 : {
2685 2 : errdetail("LDAP diagnostics: %s", message);
2686 2 : ldap_memfree(message);
2687 : }
2688 :
2689 11 : return 0;
2690 : }
2691 :
2692 : #endif /* USE_LDAP */
2693 :
2694 :
2695 : /*----------------------------------------------------------------
2696 : * SSL client certificate authentication
2697 : *----------------------------------------------------------------
2698 : */
2699 : #ifdef USE_SSL
2700 : static int
2701 29 : CheckCertAuth(Port *port)
2702 : {
2703 29 : int status_check_usermap = STATUS_ERROR;
2704 29 : char *peer_username = NULL;
2705 :
2706 : Assert(port->ssl);
2707 :
2708 : /* select the correct field to compare */
2709 29 : switch (port->hba->clientcertname)
2710 : {
2711 2 : case clientCertDN:
2712 2 : peer_username = port->peer_dn;
2713 2 : break;
2714 27 : case clientCertCN:
2715 27 : peer_username = port->peer_cn;
2716 : }
2717 :
2718 : /* Make sure we have received a username in the certificate */
2719 29 : if (peer_username == NULL ||
2720 29 : strlen(peer_username) <= 0)
2721 : {
2722 0 : ereport(LOG,
2723 : (errmsg("certificate authentication failed for user \"%s\": client certificate contains no user name",
2724 : port->user_name)));
2725 0 : return STATUS_ERROR;
2726 : }
2727 :
2728 29 : if (port->hba->auth_method == uaCert)
2729 : {
2730 : /*
2731 : * For cert auth, the client's Subject DN is always our authenticated
2732 : * identity, even if we're only using its CN for authorization. Set
2733 : * it now, rather than waiting for check_usermap() below, because
2734 : * authentication has already succeeded and we want the log file to
2735 : * reflect that.
2736 : */
2737 26 : if (!port->peer_dn)
2738 : {
2739 : /*
2740 : * This should not happen as both peer_dn and peer_cn should be
2741 : * set in this context.
2742 : */
2743 0 : ereport(LOG,
2744 : (errmsg("certificate authentication failed for user \"%s\": unable to retrieve subject DN",
2745 : port->user_name)));
2746 0 : return STATUS_ERROR;
2747 : }
2748 :
2749 26 : set_authn_id(port, port->peer_dn);
2750 : }
2751 :
2752 : /* Just pass the certificate cn/dn to the usermap check */
2753 29 : status_check_usermap = check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, peer_username, false);
2754 29 : if (status_check_usermap != STATUS_OK)
2755 : {
2756 : /*
2757 : * If clientcert=verify-full was specified and the authentication
2758 : * method is other than uaCert, log the reason for rejecting the
2759 : * authentication.
2760 : */
2761 2 : if (port->hba->clientcert == clientCertFull && port->hba->auth_method != uaCert)
2762 : {
2763 1 : switch (port->hba->clientcertname)
2764 : {
2765 0 : case clientCertDN:
2766 0 : ereport(LOG,
2767 : (errmsg("certificate validation (clientcert=verify-full) failed for user \"%s\": DN mismatch",
2768 : port->user_name)));
2769 0 : break;
2770 1 : case clientCertCN:
2771 1 : ereport(LOG,
2772 : (errmsg("certificate validation (clientcert=verify-full) failed for user \"%s\": CN mismatch",
2773 : port->user_name)));
2774 : }
2775 : }
2776 : }
2777 29 : return status_check_usermap;
2778 : }
2779 : #endif
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